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Financial Globalization and Instability of the 
World Economy
Toshiaki Hirai
_______________________________________
1. Introduction Globalization
Since the mid-1980s the world has seen the development of 
globalization under the leadership of the US and the UK. Globaliza-
tion can be summarized as “the tendency toward the market economy 
on the global scale”. It has turned out to transform the political econ-
omy of the world dramatically, to an extent such as nobody could 
have expected, and it has defined the future course along which the 
world should proceed. 
We might divide globalization into two types: “financial glob-
alization” (FG), on the one hand, and “market system (or capitalistic) 
globalization” (MG) on the other. FG is the global unification or lib-
eralization of the financial market, while MG is the multiplication of
nations, on the global level, which would adopt the market system as 
the fundamental economic mechanism. 
We may identify three upheavals which globalization has 
brought about to the world system over the last three decades: (i) re-
capture of leadership of the world economy through finance by the 
US and UK; (ii) collapse of the Cold War system and convergence 
toward the capitalistic system; (iii) rise of the emerging nations.
The first of these was caused by FG, the second and the third 
by MG. It was “Neo-Liberalism” (Thatcherism and Reaganomics) as 
a social philosophy that drew the world economy powerfully in that 
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direction – ‘leave all to the markets; government intervention in the 
economy will hamper its efficiency and development; the structure 
should be reformed in such a way that regulation be abolished as 
much as possible’. Promoted, backed and promulgated by the Neo-
Liberalists, liberalization in the field of finance, labor and capital has 
been extended literally on the global scale – above all, the liberaliza-
tion of finance (or FG).
In this paper, we will focus mainly on how FG has in the 
course of time been making the world economy increasingly unstable 
and volatile. In Section 2 we will explain how financial liberalization 
has proceeded in the US, while in Section 3 we will see how the 
world financial system has become unstable and vulnerable, leading 
up to a world economy characterized by instability. In Section 4 we 
will reflect upon what financial liberalization has implied in relation 
to the world economy. Finally, in Section 5 we will explain how the 
US administration has grappled with the meltdown caused by the 
Lehman Shock and barely managed to enact the Financial Regulato-
ry Reform Act in July 2010.
2. U.S. Financial Liberalization ?Attenuation of the Glass-Steagall 
Act and Enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
2.1 The Outline
The Glass-Steagall Act (the GS Act hereafter) enacted in 1933 
had long been a dominant instrument for regulating and overseeing 
the US financial system. In the 1920s the USA saw financial fraudu-
lence rampant, to the extent that President Roosevelt ascribed the 
Great Depression to it4
                                                          
4 The Pecora Commission made a great contribution to revealing this fact.
. So it was that the GS Act was passed with 
the aim of imposing strict regulations on the financial institutions. It 
was composed of three pillars: (i) regulation of interest rates (“Regu-
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lation Q”); (ii) separation of commercial banking from investment 
banking; (iii) regulation of interstate banking.
In the 1960s a movement calling for softer regulation was 
launched through  the lobbying activities of banks eager to enter the 
municipal bond market. But the GS Act had worked well enough up 
until the 1970s, when the situation eventually changed.
In the 1970s the investment banks tried to edge into the sphere 
of commercial banking, providing customers with money accounts 
(with interest paid), including check and credit services. The role 
which the DTCC (Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation) 
played here was significant. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s com-
puterization went ahead only in the mega investment banks, where 
individuals came to make transactions by means of the so-called 
“street names”, which worked as a sort of reserve ratio in the case of 
the commercial banks. The investment banks were able to get new 
funds by exploiting them, which aggravated the commercial banks’ 
growing impatience.
In the 1980s bills aiming at relaxing the GS Act had often 
been submitted to the Congress. Abolition of Regulation Q came first
in 1986, followed by that of interstate banking regulation in 1995
(the Rigle-Neil Act). Lastly, the separation of commercial banking 
from investment banking was unlocked by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (the GLB Act hereafter) in 1999.
2.2 Relaxing Separation between Commercial Banking and Invest-
ment Banking
Here we will see how the GS Act came to be alleviated and fi-
nally abolished, focusing on the separation of commercial banking 
from investment banking.
The movement toward relaxation might be said to have pro-
ceeded through a sequence of extended interpretations by the Federal 
Reserve Bank (FRB) of Section 20 of the GS Act. In December 1986 
the FRB interpreted a clause in the Section which prohibits “in prin-
ciple” a commercial bank from dealing in investment banking in 
such a way that it is allowed to do so for up to 5 percent of the total 
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revenue, followed by the FRB’s decision (spring of 1987) that a 
commercial bank can underwrite some securities.
Since A. Greenspan, a former executive of J.P. Morgan, was 
appointed Chairman of the FRB in 1987, relaxation of the GS Act 
was expedited through the following stages:
(i) In 1989 the FRB permitted commercial banks to engage in un-
derwriting securities for up to 10 percent of the total revenue 
(the first bank thus allowed was J.P. Morgan); 
(ii) In December 1996 the FRB authorized bank holding companies 
to have investment banks as subsidiaries for up to 25 percent of 
the total revenue;
(iii) In February 1998 there emerged a merger deal between the 
Travelers Insurance Company (the CEO was S. Weil) and Cit-
icorp (the president was J. Lead). This should have been impos-
sible under the GS Act, but vigorous lobbying activities devel-
oped targeting top figures such as Clinton, Greenspan and Ru-
bin, resulting in the FRB approval of the merger in September;
(iv) The final blow came with heated agitation calling for abolition 
of the GS Act, resulting in enactment of the GLB Act in No-
vember 1999.
2.3 Promulgators for the GLB Act
It was financiers such as Wile and Lead, and politicians and/or 
academics such as R. Rubin, L. Summers (whose protégé was Ru-
bin), Greenspan and Phil Gramm (Republican Senator) who worked 
as the promulgators for the GLB Act.
Summers and Greenspan were responsible for drawing up the 
GLB Act, alias “the Citi-Group Approval Act”. Rubin, who resigned 
as Secretary of the Treasury in July 2000, was welcomed as CEO of 
the Citi-Group. While he was there, he induced the Citi-Group to 
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embark on risky investments such as the CDO (Collateralized Debt 
Obligation)5
Gramm was also involved with enactment of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (the CFM Act hereafter), which 
gave momentum to moves to legalize the future trade of energy and 
the credit default swaps (CDS hereafter).
.
Prior to this, B. Born, chairperson of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Committee (the CFTC), who was worried that the OTC 
(Over-The-Counter) Derivatives (esp. the CDS) had been transacted 
on an ever larger scale, evading supervision of the financial authori-
ties, insisted on the need for supervision. Her move, however, came 
up against harsh opposition from Greenspan, Rubin (the then Secre-
tary of the Treasury) and Summers, who had promoted relaxation of 
the GS Act. It was they who reversed the direction and succeeded in 
enacting the
CFM Act. Wendy, Gramm’s wife and chairperson of the 
CFTC under the Reagan and the G.H. Bush Administrations, also 
worked hard for the CMF Act, thanks to which she was to be wel-
comed by Enron.
The salient feature of the CFM Act, known as the so-called 
“Enron Loophole” (the future trade’s exemption from supervision), 
lies in “the single stock future” being allowed. This was to enable 
higher leverage and more speculative activities (the Act is held re-
sponsible for the California Electricity Crisis in 2000-2001).
Enron had been very much involved in derivative dealings in 
the 1990s. In 1999 it set up “Enron Online” and greatly extended de-
rivative dealings. It was subsequently to be exposed for continued 
fraudulent accounting and was forced into bankruptcy, setting the 
scene for the so-called “Dotcom Bubble” to burst.
                                                          
5 Incidentally, Geithner, the Secretary of the Treasury (Summers was a pro-
tégé), was president of the FRB of New York. In September 2008 he forced 
the Lehman Brothers to go into bankruptcy, and yet bailed out the Citi-
Group with the TARP fund. 
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Phil Gramm6 was thereafter welcomed as executive by UBS7,
where he is reputed to have played a central role in its extensive in-
volvement with the CDS.
3. The Instability of the World Financial System
How are we to evaluate the influences on the world economy 
resulting from financial liberalization or globalization? They can be 
approached from both affirmative and problematic viewpoints.
Enabling capital to move to the regions where it can obtain 
higher rates of profit, FG has contributed to generating vigorous eco-
nomic growth such as would otherwise have been impossible in these 
areas.
Leaving further considerations from this affirmative viewpoint 
to a later date, we will focus here on the problematic aspect – the in-
stability of the world financial system as cause of the collapse of the
world economy. Firstly we will take the rise of the Shadow Banking 
System, followed by two examples of turbulence.
3.1 The Rise of the Shadow Banking System
Gaining momentum in the 1980s, FG ingenerated the “Shad-
ow Banking System” (SBS hereafter). The US financial system, 
which had so far been supervised by the FRB under the GS Act of 
1933 with the purpose of keeping the speculative activities of bank-
ing business under control, began to enjoy more relaxed conditions 
subsequent to the above-mentioned financial liberalization, spawn-
                                                          
6 Gramm ran for Republican nomination in the 1966 presidential election. In 
the 2008 campaign for the Presidency he was among McCain’s principal 
supporters. According to a certain source, he would have been the Secretary 
of the Treasury if McCain had been elected as President.
7 In October 2008 the UBS, which suffered a huge loss, not only received 
public money (to the tune of 6 billion Swiss francs) from the Swiss 
government, but also handed over the bad assets (amounting to 72 billion 
Swiss francs) to it.
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ing a whole series of new financial institutions such as hedge funds 
and private equity funds, which lend themselves freely to speculative 
dealings without supervision by the financial authorities. Working 
out various kinds of securitized papers such as the MBS, the CDO 
and the CDS and using leverage, these institutions came to be in-
volved in risky speculative dealings in the global financial markets. 
Having witnessed their surprisingly high rates of return, the com-
mercial banks, which had been kept under control by the FRB, found 
their way into the SBS by means of an off-balance technique, the 
product being “Special Investment Vehicles” (or SIV). 
Thus, as the years went by the SBS grew bigger and bigger, to 
such a degree that the share of conventional banking shrank ever 
smaller, making the world financial system increasingly unstable and 
volatile.
Excessive FG had often precipitated the world economy into 
critical conditions, and yet the world had managed to avoid any great 
catastrophe. Eventually, however, FG led to the Lehman-shock in 
September 2008, which set the world financial system as well as the 
world economy plunging precipitously.
The resulting situation prompts the following questions: could 
the rise of the SBS really have been desirable, and indeed indispen-
sable to the development of the world economy? What justification 
can there be for the layered securitized papers (see below) and the 
financial institutions’ speculative activities free from any supervi-
sion? To what extent can the financial engineering be justified in 
terms of improvement and/or growth of the capitalistic system? 
Leaving these questions to Section 4.2 below, here we will 
take two examples of economic instability as caused by excessive 
FG: the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and the subprime loan 
crisis of 2008, which see the US, the EU and Japan still in search of 
the way out8
                                                          
8 As examples of serious financial crises which occurred in the US (albeit 
having no influence abroad), we may mention the S&L crisis (around 
1990?and the burst of the Dotcom Bubble (around 2001; Enron is 
emblematic there).
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3.2 Two Examples
.
The Asian Financial Crisis  The crisis of 1997, which start-
ed in Thailand, was caused by speculative activities in hedge funds. 
Thailand, which adopted the dollar-pegged system, began to suffer 
from a sharp drop in exports because of the appreciation of the dollar 
(and thus of the baht). Hedge funds, seeing the opportunity for 
speculation, continued to sell off the baht, which finally forced the 
Thai Government to devalue it. The Thai economy, which had so far 
gone on achieving a high rate of economic growth thanks to dollars 
borrowed in the short term, plunged into a serious depression which 
abruptly increased the debt in terms of the dollar. The depression 
rapidly propagated to Malaysia, Indonesia and so forth.
The hedge funds’ speculative activities then turned to target 
Russia in 1998. In 1991 the Soviet Union had disintegrated into sev-
eral nations, the largest being Russia. President Yeltsin went ahead 
with transformation of the Russian economy into a capitalistic sys-
tem at a breakneck pace – the so-called “shock-therapy method”. The 
result turned out to be devastating, causing high inflation and severe
unemployment, as well as fiscal crisis in 1997. The Russian govern-
ment was forced to collect the necessary revenues through the issue 
of national bonds. Thus it was Russia, sunk in a very fragile and cha-
otic situation, that the hedge funds targeted. Russia failed to maintain 
the ruble, and was forced to declare default for the national bonds.
Now came the turn of a hedge fund named “Long Term Capi-
tal Management” (LTCM hereafter), which continued to buy the 
Russian bonds. It gloried in its two Nobel Laureates for Economics 
(for the “Black-Scholes Equation” determining option prices) as co-
founders. Although it had only 150 employees, it gained such a high 
reputation due to its initial startling success that major banks from all 
over the world were willing to hand out blank checks. Around 1998 
LTCM, a neutral-type hedge fund, came to manipulate 100 billion 
dollars and to take a position of 1000 billion dollars.
Due to the Russian bond default, however, LTCM suffered 
heavy loss. Suddenly there emerged a very real possibility that, if the 
LTCM were left as it was, the world would plunge into a formidable 
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financial crisis. It was in September 1998 that the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (the then president was T. Geithner) asked the 
Wall Street megabanks to bail out LTCM. Thanks to this prompt ac-
tion the world economy managed to avoid an impending crisis.
The Subprime Loan Crisis? This crisis erupted in September 
2008. Since 2005 high interest rate mortgage loans had been made, 
targeting the low income earners (the so-called “subprime loans”). 
The financial institutions bought them up, and issued MBSs (Mort-
gage-Backed Securities) with them as collateral. Then new types of 
securities were issued one after another, mingling other loans such as 
car loans, credit card loans and so forth as collateral. Thus the US 
economy came to be filled with multi-layered securities (“securitized 
papers”), which were duly certified by rating agencies, such as 
Moody’s, as definitely safe securities (80 percent of the securitized 
papers based on the subprime mortgage loans were ranked as AAA), 
and sold all over the world. The financial institutions eventually went 
as far as issuing subprime mortgage loans without any assessment 
(the so-called “Ninja Loans”), and, based on them, set about structur-
ing layered securitized papers. Thus the negative concatenation went 
on. It was on the occasion of the Lehman Shock that this fragile 
monetary and credit structure collapsed, plunging the world economy 
into deep depression.
4. “Financial Liberalization” Considered
As explained above, financial liberalization proceeded with 
the impulsion of financial capital toward liberalization as catalyst. It 
was a movement led by: (i) the US commercial banks, eager to break 
out of the conditions imposed by the GS Act; (ii) the competition of 
the above banks with the US investment banks which, free from reg-
ulation, saw rapid development; (iii) the US government, which 
again wanted to hold the world financial market as well as the world 
economy in the palm of its hands. 
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Motivated with this impulsion, the leading actors such as Ru-
bin, Greenspan, Summers and politicians like Gramm made great ef-
forts to attenuate the GS through extended interpretations of Section 
20 and finally succeeded in getting through the GLB Act as well as 
the CMF Act.
4.1 The Geopolitical Significance
Financial liberalization accorded well with the US govern-
ment’s desire to regain world hegemony in the economic scene. The 
US Administrations which had suffered miserable economic perfor-
mance throughout the 1980s came to think that finance could be a 
key to regain and extend US influence over the world economy. The 
“Washington Consensus”, adopted by the IMF and the World Bank, 
as well as the “Shock Therapy” method, adopted by the former 
members of the Soviet Bloc, with US economists as advisers9
These movements, moreover, derived strong support and cred-
ibility from the intellectual authority related to Neo-Liberalism, fi-
nancial engineering, and the New Classical School as well as ideolo-
gies such as Neo-Conservatism and the Christian Fundamentalism. 
To say nothing of these ideologies, Neo-Liberalism also took on a 
very authoritarian stance, quite different from its ostensible one. As 
the progenitor of “freedom”, the Neo-Liberalists did not hesitate to 
interfere with foreign countries where freedom, as they conceived it, 
was judged to be lacking, through either the “structural adjustment 
program” or military operations. In this sense, Neo-Liberalism con-
tains a sort of “Power-ism”.
, also 
accorded with the financial liberalization movement. 
In terms of political dynamics, furthermore, these movements 
can be said to have proceeded hand in hand with Cleptocracy – the 
“quid pro quo” ties between financiers and the financial authorities.
                                                          
9 The most famous, and indeed, notorious was A. Schleifer, Professor at 
Harvard University (his protégé is L. Summers), in the case of Russia. 
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4.2 The Economic Significance
What kind of economic significance will financial liberaliza-
tion be seen to have?
It constitutes an extension of the markets in which the finan-
cial institutions can raise funds to have at their own disposal (where 
securitized papers are structured, accompanying leverage), always 
pursuing speculative profits by means of the funds thus obtained. In-
deed, in some cases the pursuit of profit has been practiced to such a 
degree as to incur moral hazard.
Hedge funds have targeted weak and fragile countries, mount-
ing speculative attacks to make huge gains with no concern for the 
considerable damage to the countries concerned, ascribing the de-
fects and failures to their economic systems. In recent years these at-
titudes have become blatantly evident. “Finance for finance’s sake”, 
or speculative activities without any regard for the real economy, can 
be characterized as “autotelism” on the part of financial capital, far 
	  	 	   	
    	 	
providing the financial activities required to make the real economy 
grow, and making the market economy run smoothly. Thus we see 
the phenomenon of real economy caught up in speculative waves.
The enlargement of the SBS was also a product of the activi-
ties of governments under the leadership of the US administration, 
which means some divergence from the original role which each 
government should play ? the pursuit of its own economic growth. 
Any government should be independent of the financial community, 
implementing its own policies and placing top priority on the well-
being of its people. In the movement aiming at financial liberaliza-
tion, in fact, various governments including the US government have 
gone hand in glove with the financial community at the cost of a 
stampede of hedge funds, the emergence of multi-layered securitized 
papers and a catastrophic meltdown.
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5. The Financial Regulatory Reform Act
The instability of the world economy recently witnessed ap-
pears to be attributable to the enlargement of the SBS: if we are to 
stabilize the world economy, therefore, we need to bring it under the 
control of the financial authorities. This is a point recognized by the 
Obama Administration.
5.1 How the Story Went in the US
Obama’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals 
June 2009 when President Obama made public the outline of his fi-
nancial regulatory reform proposals, aiming at repeal of the GLB Act 
and modern-day resurrection of the GS Act.
The central pillars are: (i) enlargement of the FRB, which is to 
work not only as a central bank but also as an institution to oversee
systemic risk; (ii) creation of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency (CFPA), to guard consumers from financial abuse and 
fraudulence. 
Through these institutions dealings in securitized papers, fi-
nancial derivatives, futures and so forth were to be on open and clear 
markets, while the activities of hedge funds, investment banks, rat-
ing agencies and so forth could be overseen. Thus the proposal aims 
at scaling down, if not abolishing, the SBS.
The Bailout and Early Recovery of the Megabanks First and 
foremost, the Wall Street megabanks were rescued through bailout 
with huge sums of public money10
The story does not end here. They were soon able to make 
immense profits by investing gigantic volumes of money obtainable 
with both the FRB’s zero interest rate and quantitative easing (QE) 
policy, in the emerging nations (such as China, Brazil and India)
.
                                                          
10 Funded by the TARP (the Troubled Asset Relief Program), which was 
hastily proposed, and was to be used in a very ambiguous way by the Bush 
Administration. 
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through the so-called “zero carry trade”. Having repaid the public 
money to the government, the megabanks were to start a fierce battle 
aiming at blocking Obama’s financial regulatory reform11.
The Growing Perception of Unfairness? Contrastingly, in 
spite of the FRB’s easy-money policy, the US real economy cannot 
be said to have made much progress towards recovery. Major wor-
ries for the American people include, among other things, the contin-
ued high unemployment rate, the rapid increase in arrears and fore-
closure due to the bust of the housing market, which has also driven 
many local banks into bankruptcy (the number reaching a record 
high since the S&L crisis in 1992). The credit crunch by the local 
banks, in turn, has aggravated the real economy. 
The perception of unfairness has grown among the public, for 
the Wall Street was instantaneously bailed out (by the Bush Admin-
istration) while the Main Street has remained stagnant (in spite of the 
Obama Administration’s strenuous efforts).
5.2 The Dodd-Frank Act
The Process? After public announcement of Obama’s finan-
cial regulatory reform proposals in June 2009, deliberations in the 
two houses proceeded very slowly.
On December 11, 2009 the financial regulatory reform act (the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) got through in the 
House of Representatives. However, the Senate version, which was 
first laid out as a discussion draft in November 2009, was to proceed 
along a very difficult road thereafter. Leaving the details to my other 
paper12, let us here summarize the process in the Senate:
                                                          
11 As representative of the lobbyists criticizing financial regulation, we may 
mention the American Bankers Association, while in support of it we have 
an example in the U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
12 See Hirai (2010).
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(i) In May 2010 the Dodd Act (the Restoring American Financial 
Stability Act) was deliberated.
(ii) The deliberations continued for three weeks. On May 21 at long 
last the Dodd Act was passed with some slight modifications. 
(iii) The Conference Committee was then set up to unify the House 
and Senate versions. After a few weeks’ deliberations, the 
committee report was adopted.
(iv) On June 30 the Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the House, while 
on July 15 it finally got through in the Senate.
(v) On July 21 the Act was ratified with President Obama’s signa-
ture.
The Gist of the Act??The Dodd-Frank Act covers the following.
(1) The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA).
This is to be set up within the FRB, but should remain independent. 
The director is to be nominated by the President (this reflects some 
compromise between the House version and the President’s view?.
During the subprime boom many financial institutions made 
mortgage loans to people on low incomes without any serious 
screening. In consequence, when the bubble burst a great many peo-
ple were rapidly driven into default and foreclosure. It is in order to 
prevent this state of affairs from recurring (that is, to prevent con-
sumers from being cheated and forced to conclude unfair contracts) 
that the CFPA is to be set up.
(2) Volcker Rule
This was first advocated by P. Volcker in January 2010 and support-
ed by Obama, and was incorporated into the Act. The rule aims at 
prohibiting commercial banks from dealing in so-called “proprietary 
trading”, for it would expose the depositors’ money to risk through 
speculative activities by the banks13.
                                                          
13 This September JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs decided to close the 
proprietary trading section, heeding the Volcker Rule.
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(3) Lincoln Provision
This provision was first adopted by the Senate Agriculture Commit-
tee chaired by B. Lincoln in April 2010 and was incorporated into 
the Act. It aims at making derivative transactions fair and transparent 
by abolishing Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives and creating an 
open market14.
(4) Establishment of a committee to prevent possible systemic risk
The committee is to be composed of nine members headed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.
(5) The president of the FRB of New York is to be appointed by the 
US President.
The aim here is to block influences from the Wall Street.
(6) In the case of megabanks running into bankruptcy, clearing and 
dissolution should be carried out smoothly with the fund collected 
from the financial industry.
In short, the “TBTF” (Too Big To Fail) idea should be swept away. 
The megabanks have got used to assuming that because they are 
huge the government will never fail to rescue them in the event of 
their failure. Otherwise the economy as a whole, they think, would 
be exposed to serious crisis. Thus they are likely to venture upon im-
possible speculative activities – and all this adds up to serious moral 
hazard.
Challenging the TBTF, the provision aims at clearing financial 
institutions on the brink of failure through the self-responsibility of 
the financial industry rather than with taxes.
It is estimated that it will take a year and half for the Dodd-
Frank Act to be implemented. Each section needs interpretation, so 
                                                          
14 Recently the yields gained by hedge funds have shown some decline. 
Wary of risks, investors are now tending to concentrate their resources in 
large funds rather than small ones.
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there will be confrontation on it. Lobbying activities are very influ-
ential and might change the nature and the course of direction.
Moreover, should other countries – including the EU (with the 
UK) – fail to follow suit, the aim of the Dodd-Frank Act will be 
thwarted. For finance has been developed on the global scale, so any 
loopholes will remain gaping. If the US intensified regulation but 
other countries did not follow suit, the financial institutions would 
continue risky speculative activities, shifting their headquarters to the 
more easy-going countries. 
And yet the Dodd-Frank Act should be welcomed, for this will 
be the only feasible and effective path which could lead to financial 
regulation on the global level.
Worrisome Present Situation  As of today we need to bear in mind 
the following facts of the US economy.
Although the need to keep the activities of the financial institutions 
under the control of the financial authorities has been repeatedly 
urged since the Lehman Shock, it was not until July 21, 2010 that the 
Dodd-Frank Act was at long last enacted – just a few months ago. It 
will take another year and a half, moreover, for the Act to be effec-
tively implemented. This means that so far virtually no regulation 
has been imposed on the SBS system.
The Wall Street megabanks were rescued by the government 
and made huge profits through the dollar carry trade: scandalously 
enough, these profits were then distributed among the executives 
who, by contrast, have shown no interest in helping get the Main 
Street back on its feet. 
These states of affairs have infuriated the common people with 
the impression that all that the Administration and the FRB have 
done so far has been to rescue the Wall Street, while leaving them in 
the lurch. Such anger might appear all the more justifiable on re-
calling the barefaced personnel adhesion among the FRB, the Treas-
ury and the megabanks.
The US society faces the potential risk of serious conflict be-
tween the two groups ? the mega financial community and the 
masses. 
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In spite of the serious difficulties President Obama came up 
against, he finally succeeded in putting through the Dodd-Frank Act. 
This is a great achievement, although it amounts to only one step 
forward. The real test of its success hinges on the implementation 
from now on. 
In this regard what is worrying is the fact that the approval rate 
for the Obama Administration has been sharply falling, mainly be-
cause it has not succeeded in reducing the high rate of unemploy-
ment. So at present the Republican Party is expected to win the mid-
term election in November. If so, the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act will entail great difficulties. Even today the Administra-
tion has some difficulty in deciding the top-ranking posts of the new 
institutions to be set up by the Act. The difficulty will be much 
greater after the election.
6. Conclusion
We have examined financial liberalization or globalization, 
and the increased instability of the capitalistic system brought about 
by it, focusing on the USA as a center of the world economic system. 
We cannot imagine continuance of the capitalistic system without 
finance. And yet there is a danger that serious meltdowns will be re-
peated if the financial system is left as it is. The future of capitalism 
will hinge upon how the “right capitalism” can be maintained and 
developed, harnessing this restive horse. 
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